T he study of cooperation between unrelated individuals received a major boost from Axelrod & Hamilton's (1981) classic formulation of an evolutionarily stable solution (Tit for Tat, TFT) to the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). More recent models have shown that TFT is not always evolutionarily stable (Nowak & Sigmund 1993) : indeed one can always find a mixed strategy capable of invading any pure strategy, including TFT (Dugatkin 1997). However, TFT has remained the most frequently investigated strategy in experimental studies of cooperation. Observations consistent with TFT have been reported for various animal species (Lombardo 1985; Milinski 1987; Dugatkin 1988; Milinski et al. 1990; Huntingford et al. 1994) . Recently, Clements & Stephens (1995) disputed such claims on the grounds that (1) the payoff structures of the behaviours in question did not necessarily conform to PD, and (2) alternative explanations were not considered. Clements & Stephens (1995) recorded the behaviour of blue jays playing carefully controlled PD and mutualism games, and found stable cooperation only in the latter situation. Because the payoff structure of mutualism games ensures that cooperation is the best choice regardless of what your partner/ opponent does, the occurrence of cooperation in such games is simply a by-product of individual animals maximizing their own immediate rewards without reacting to each other's behaviour at all (Roberts 1997). Thus there is no need to invoke reciprocity or TFT as a necessary route to cooperation. Clements & Stephens (1995) and Stephens et al. (1997) suggest that by-product mutualism is the most parsimonious explanation for the occurrence of cooperation in a number of species, including humans. Clements & Stephens (1995) go so far as to state that 'there is no empirical evidence of nonkin cooperation in a situation, natural or contrived, where the payoffs are known to conform to a Prisoner's Dilemma' (page 533). Although we agree wholeheartedly that evidence of reciprocity requires experimental rigour, the experiments have been done and the evidence is there, at least for humans.
There is an extensive literature in social psychology and experimental economics on human behaviour in mixedmotive games like PD. Many studies have found that stable cooperation is a common outcome of two-party and multiparty games (Pruitt & Kimmel 1977) , especially when most players use TFT (Manstead & Hewstone 1995) . Rapaport & Chammah (1965) are cited by Clements & Stephens (1995) and Stephens et al. (1997) as providing evidence that most PD games stabilize into mutual defection. In fact Rapaport & Chammah (1965) show that although cooperation initially declines in the first 30 trials, it ascends over the final 30 trials so that even players who appeared to be locked into mutual defection often switch to mutual cooperation. Results like this probably led Anatol Rapaport to conceptualize the strategy TFT, the eventual winner of Axelrod & Hamilton's (1981) celebrated tournament. In this commentary, we shall briefly review some recent studies that consider mixed-motive games from an explicitly evolutionary perspective.
The standard PD game has two possible strategies (cooperate or defect) and four possible outcomes, two symmetric (i.e. players play the same strategy and receive equal payoffs) and two asymmetric (i.e. players play different strategies and receive unequal payoffs). The PD is structured so that defection always yields higher payoffs than cooperation regardless of what the other player does. Therefore, if both players use the principle of dominance, that is, choose the strategy that yields the higher potential payoff, mutual defection is the endpoint. If players use reciprocity though, only symmetric outcomes are possible, and mutual cooperation is the endpoint because it is more profitable than mutual defection. Mixed motives arise from the fact that dominance
